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Compelling Interest, Forbidden Aim:
the Antinomy of Grutter and Gratz
PATRICK S. SHIN*

INTRODUCTION

If racial diversity is a compelling state interest in the context of
university admissions policies, why is it constitutionally impermissible for
a policy to establish such diversity by giving an automatic, uniform
preference to every applicant who belongs to an underrepresented minority
group?
Anyone familiar with the Supreme Court's opinions in Grutter v.
Bollinger' and Gratz v. Bollinger' will likely have a ready answer: an
admissions policy of this kind does not guarantee "individualized
consideration" to every applicant and so fails to satisfy the narrow-tailoring
requirement of strict scrutiny. That is, after all, exactly what the Court
said.3 But, on reflection, this doctrinally pat answer is conceptually
puzzling.4 What Grutterpurports to hold is that an admissions policy can
permissibly grant preferences to some applicants on the basis of their race,
so long as those preferences are based on individualized consideration.
This sounds simple enough. But the difficulty is articulating how the
requirement of individualized consideration is supposed to square with the
permissibility of race-based preference. What could it mean to evaluate an
applicant "as an individual" and yet, at the same time, grant her preferential
consideration on the basis of her membership in a racial group? It hardly
helps matters to appeal to the general governing principle that is supposed
to be in play here - namely, a principle of equal treatment. For if the
* Assistant Professor, Suffolk University Law School; Ph.D. Candidate
(Philosophy), Harvard University; J.D., Harvard Law School. Many thanks to Scott Baker,
Richard Fallon, Owen Fiss, Lani Guinier, Mitu Gulati, Emily Gumper, Christine Jolls,
Kenneth Karst, Niko Kolodny, Chris Korsgaard, Kim Krawiecz, Bill Marshall, Frank
Michelman, Tim Scanlon, Amartya Sen, Jiewuh Song, Gisela Striker, Michael Yelnosky,
and the members of the Moral and Political Philosophy Workshop at Harvard University for
their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
1. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
2. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
3. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271.
4. Cf. Robert Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term - Foreword: Fashioning the
Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARv. L. REV. 4, 72 (2003)
(characterizing as "genuinely puzzling" the question of how to reconcile the requirement of
individualized consideration with the permissible pursuit of racial diversity).
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interest in achieving racial diversity is sufficient under the Equal Protection
Clause to justify granting a race-based admissions preference to some
number of underrepresented minority applicants on a case-by-case basis in
order to alleviate their underrepresentation, why should it be impermissible,
as a matter of equal treatment, automatically to distribute that preference
proportionally to all applicants so as to produce the same result?
I argue that there is no satisfactory answer to this question - or, to be
more precise, that there is no coherent principle of equal treatment that
provides one. What we should say about the question I opened with, then,
is that it makes a counterfactual assumption. My claim is that the Grutter
decision, when read as of a piece with Gratz, cannot logically be
interpreted to hold what almost everyone assumes it does. I propose a
reading of the cases on which the cases jointly support the opposite
conclusion: that racial diversity is not a compelling state interest.
This claim will undoubtedly seem implausible to some. It does, to be
sure, run against the grain of key portions of Justice O'Connor's opinion in
Grutter. I will argue, however, that despite Justice O'Connor's expansive
comments in that opinion concerning the value of racial diversity, an
important conceptual instability in her reasoning opens up an interpretation
under which the Grutter decision cannot be accommodated to the
companion holding of Gratz except on a much narrower understanding of
the constitutionally cognizable interest in diversity. More specifically, I
argue that the Court's decisions in the two cases can be read jointly to
imply that affirmative action policies are constitutionally permissible only
on a model according to which the race of an applicant is regarded as a
predictorof an applicant's expected contribution to the diversity of a given
population, rather than as a characteristic that is itself a constituent of such
diversity. On this interpretation, the interest in diversity that justifies racebased preference under Grutter and Gratz is an interest not in racial
diversity as such, but diversity in some color-blind modality to which race
is at most only contingently related.
In Section I, I open my investigation with a comparison of the two
different accounts of the value of diversity in the educational context that
emerge from Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of University of
Californiav. Bakke5 and Justice O'Connor's opinion in Grutter. In Section
II, I undertake an extended analysis of the conceptual puzzle set up by the
juxtaposition of the capacious account of diversity's value that Justice
O'Connor develops in the first part of her Grutteropinion and the doctrinal
requirement of "individualized consideration" she endorses in the second
part, which the Court applies with dispositive effect in Gratz. In Section
III, I discuss how Justice O'Connor's response to an objection asserted by
Chief Justice Rehnquist in Gratz - which I refer to as the "Monet
objection" - suggests an interpretation of the cases that directly conflicts
5. 438U.S. 265 (1978).
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with the idea that racial diversity constitutes a compelling interest. Finally,
in Section IV, I offer some diagnostic observations reinforcing the
suggestion that Justice O'Connor's insistence on the requirement of
individualized consideration either involved a conceptual mistake or was
rooted in pragmatic considerations rather than in genuine concerns of equal
treatment.
I. FROM BAKKE TO GRU7TER

The legal prologue to Grutter and Gratz is by now familiar to
everyone, but I revisit briefly the central case in the standard chronicle in
order to set the stage for my examination of the relation between the
compelling interest in diversity and the constraining requirement of
"individualized consideration."
The diversity rationale of course received its first significant 6 Supreme
Court treatment in Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke.7 That case involved
a challenge to an affirmative action policy that had been implemented by
the medical school of the University of California at Davis.8 In an array of
separate opinions, the Court in Bakke overturned a decision of the

California Supreme Court that had held that it was constitutionally

impermissible for the medical school to take any consideration of the race
of applicants in making admissions decisions. 9 In the famous opinion in
which he staked out his then-solitary position, 0 Justice Powell argued that
policies that use racial classifications for "benign" purposes (such as
affirmative action programs) are nevertheless subject to strict scrutiny
6. Even before Bakke or even Brown, the Court had recognized the possibility that
racial diversity might be pedagogically beneficial. See Goodwin Liu, Affirmative Action in
Higher Education: the Diversity Rationale and the Compelling Interest Test, 33 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 381, 386-87 (1998) (citing Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) and
McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950)).
7. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 269-324.
8. Under that policy, sixteen of 100 seats in each incoming class were filled under a
"special admissions" program for which only certain minority groups were eligible. Some
of the minority students who were admitted to fill those sixteen places had GPA and MCAT
scores that were "significantly lower" than those of some non-minority students competing
for the remaining eighty-four seats who were rejected under the general admissions
program. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 277-78.
9. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320.
10. The only other Justice who joined in any part of Justice Powell's opinion (other
than the sections reciting the facts and announcing the disposition) was Justice White, who
joined in the section in which Justice Powell rejected the University's argument that strict
scrutiny should apply only to policies utilizing racial classifications that disadvantage
"'discrete and insular minorities."' Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287-88 (quoting United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)). The so-called "Brennan Four"
would have held the medical school's policy to be constitutional. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at
324 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The other Justices argued for
avoidance of the constitutional issue. See id. at 408 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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under the Fourteenth Amendment." He then went on to say that the
"attainment of a diverse student body" was a compelling state interest for
2
purposes of the strict scrutiny test.'
Justice Powell, however, qualified his view in two important ways.
First, he made explicit that the interest in diversity that could justify the use
of racial preferences in university admissions was not an interest in "simple
ethnic diversity," but a type of diversity "of which racial or ethnic origin is
a single though important element.' 3 The value of this type of diversity is
rooted in the educational benefits - the "discourse benefits," to borrow a
helpful characterization 14 that flow from the "atmosphere of
'speculation, experiment and creation""' most conducive to the "'robust
exchange of ideas"' that is promoted by a diverse student body.' 6 Second,
Justice Powell argued that in seeking to populate an incoming class
characterized by this kind of diversity, it was impermissible for an
admissions policy to employ set-asides, quotas, or other procedures that
deny "individualized consideration" to every applicant. 7
Thus, for Justice Powell, since the value of diversity was entirely
derivative of the discourse benefits that flow from a racially and otherwise
heterogeneous student body,' 8 a university could permissibly target racial
or ethnic diversity for the sake of obtaining those benefits by considering
race as a "plus" in an applicant's favor,'19 but it could not adopt a policy that
focused solely on racial diversity, 20 to the exclusion of other types of
diversity that might also facilitate educationally beneficial discourse. ' The
insistence on "individualized consideration," therefore, served primarily to
reinforce the notion that since the rationale of discourse benefits did not
justify an exclusive focus on racial diversity, that rationale could not justify
a policy that effectively gave applicants who were members of racial
minority groups an exclusive claim on a certain number of seats (set aside
or reserved by quota) in an incoming class. The "right to individualized
consideration 22 invoked by Justice Powell was thus meant to ensure that
11. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 294-99. This view was eventually vindicated by a majority of
the Court in Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989) and Adarand Constructors v. Pefia,
515 U.S. 200 (1995).
12. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-14.
13. Id. at315.
14. Thomas H. Lee, University Dons and Warrior Chieftains: Two Concepts of
Diversity, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 2301, 2305-06 (2004).

15. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263
(1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
16. Id. at 312-13 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
17. Id. at 318 & n.52.
18. See PETER H. SCHuCK, DivERsrrY IN AMERICA 164-65 (2003).
19. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318.
20.

Id. at315.

21. See SCHUCK, supra note 18, at 165.
22. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318 n.52.
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no individual would be entirely foreclosed from competing for any given
seat in a class on the basis of her race, 23 as would happen under a program
of rigid set-asides.24
Justice Powell did not suggest, however, that individualized
consideration required that all potential contributions to discourseenhancing diversity, whether racial or nonracial, be treated as fungible and
hence given equal weight in an admissions procedure. On the contrary, he
explicitly noted that although a constitutionally permissible policy would
place value on nonracial as well as racial forms of diversity, it would "not
necessarily accord[] them the same weight., 25 Thus, in Justice Powell's
view, the requirement of individualized consideration did not necessarily
preclude the possibility of assigning greater value to racial diversity than to
nonracial diversity, even though the value of both kinds of diversity was
derivative of the discourse benefits they could be expected to yield.
Justice Powell's view that student body diversity could provide a
compelling state interest for purposes of strict scrutiny was of course
2 6 Justice
vindicated in Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Grutter.
O'Connor's account of the reasons for bringing about diversity in a student
body, however, is significantly broader than Justice Powell's.27 She begins
her discussion on common ground with Justice Powell, characterizing the
benefits." 28
interest in a diverse student body as tied to its "educational
Echoing Justice Powell's appeal to discourse benefits, Justice O'Connor
acknowledges that part of the value of a diverse student body lies in the
increased awareness of different viewpoints and the felicitous
consequences for classroom discussion that
' 29result "when students have 'the
backgrounds."'
of
variety
possible
greatest
Going beyond the benefits that accrue to the academic enterprise
itself, Justice O'Connor describes a broader range of reasons that we might
have for valuing a diverse student body. First, she argues that such
diversity will lead to better preparation of students for a diverse workforce
and society, including, in particular, enabling the military to fulfill its
30
mission of providing national security in racially diverse settings. Second,

23. See id. at 319-20.
24. See Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L. REv.
1745, 1751 (1996).
25. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317.

26. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325 ("[T]oday we endorse Justice Powell's view that student
body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university
admissions.").

27.

See Post, supra note 4, at 59-60.

28. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343. In fact, the only justificatory rationale for affirmative
action that had been argued to the Court was that there was a compelling interest in
obtaining "the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body." Id. at 317.
29. Id. at 330 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. at 246a, 244).
30. Seeid. at 330-31.
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Justice O'Connor also identifies various important social goals and ideals
that are served by the attainment of diversity in educational institutions
(especially law schools): "effective participation by members of all racial
and ethnic groups in the civic life of our nation; ' 3 1 the opening of a visible
"path to leadership... [for] talented and qualified individuals of every race
and ethnicity '32 in order to "cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the
eyes of the citizenry,, 33 and the realization of the possibility that "all
members of our heterogeneous society may participate in the educational
institutions that provide the training and education necessary to succeed in
America.

34

While it may still make sense to group these kinds of goods that flow
from diversity as "educational benefits," it is clear that these are benefits
realized not within the confines of the academic institution, but in the form
of social goods that characterize a well-functioning democracy.35 These
are not easily subsumable under the general category of discourse benefits.
They are, rather, benefits tied to broader goals of democratic inclusion3 6
and the realization of an integrated society founded on equal citizenship. 3 7
What is significant for my analysis is that the kind of diversity that is called
for by a commitment to these benefits and social ideals - which are
pitched explicitly in terms of ethnic and racial integration - is not just a
general diversity of outlook and experience, but racial diversity in
particular. For if the reason we have for promoting diversity in the
university setting is to lay a foundation for the "effective participation by
members of all racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation,"8
the type of diversity that seems particularly relevant is racial diversity. As
Robert Post has argued, the "account of diversity embraced by Grutterdoes
not conceive of race as simply one element in a potentially infinite universe
of differences. It instead points to the particular and unique value of racial
diversity. 3 9
Justice O'Connor's discussion of the distinct value of racial diversity
naturally invites a more permissive attitude toward policies of racial
preference. Assuming that the achievement of racialdiversity as such
31. Id. at 332.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333.
35. Cf Post, supra note 4, at 60 (distinguishing value intrinsic to the educational
process from "extrinsic social goods like professionalism, citizenship, or leadership"); cf
also Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as PoliticalActs: Guardians at the Gate of Our
DemocraticIdeals, 117 HARV. L. REv. 113, 206 (2003).
36. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Revival of Forward-LookingAffirmative Action, 104
COLUM. L. Rsv. 60, 72-73 (2004); Elizabeth Anderson, Integration,Affirmative Action and
Strict Scrutiny, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1195, 1222-27 (2002).
37. See Karst, supra note 36, at 72.
38. Grutter,539 U.S. at 332.
39. Post, supra note 4, at 70.
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as opposed to whatever diversity best serves vigorous discourse - is a
constitutionally permissible goal, one might suppose that admissions
officers should have some latitude in constructing policies that
unapologetically take direct account of applicants' racial membership in
trying to achieve it. 40 But this is not the turn that Justice O'Connor's
reasoning seems to take. Even as she moves away from Justice Powell's
account of the indirect relevance of race to diversity, she still adopts his
requirement that the pursuit of diversity be constrained by "individualized
consideration." Indeed, she argues that the critical difference between the
affirmative action policy of the University of Michigan Law School which the Court upheld in Grutter- and the policy of the University of
Michigan's College of Literature, Science and the Arts - which the Court
invalidated in Gratz - was ,recisely that the former policy treated each
and therefore satisfied the requirement of
applicant "as an individual'
individualized consideration, whereas the latter, with its policy of
42
automatic preferences for all minority applicants, did not.
The negative holding of Gratz thus signals the Court's intention to
take the requirement of individualized consideration seriously. The
important theoretical question is whether, given Justice O'Connor's
discussion in Grutter concerning the value of racial diversity, we can
identify a distinction between a policy of individualized consideration and
one of "automatic" preference that makes sense under some norm that we
would recognize as having moral and constitutional significance. Of
course, one might conclude either that the distinction just does not make4
considerations.
any sense43 or that it is grounded in primarily pragmatic
But since both Grutter and Gratz purport to be decisions that interpret the
idea of equal treatment embedded in the Equal Protection Clause, we
should at least make an attempt to see whether their contrasting outcomes
can be reconciled under some principle that we would recognize as
sounding in genuine concerns of equal treatment. It is to this inquiry which is at least as much a project of rational reconstruction as it is one of
textual interpretation - that I now turn.
II. THE PUZZLE OF INDIVIDUALIZED CONSIDERATION

Let us provisionally assume, per Justice O'Connor's discussion in
Grutter, that the diversity of student body that constitutes a compelling
40. See id. at 69-70.
41. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337-38.
42. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 280 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
43. See Robert George, Gratz and Grutter: Some HardQuestions, 103 COLUM. L. REv.
1634, 1634 (2003) (suggesting that there is probably no good way to make sense of the
distinction).
44. See Post, supra note 4, at 73-74 (suggesting that the real concern motivating the
Court's position in Gratz is the fear of endorsing a kind of policy that might engender racial
"balkanization").

438

UNIVERSITY OF DETROIT MERCYLA WREVIEW

[Vol. 82:431

state interest consists at least partly in racial diversity.
From this
assumption it follows, at a minimum, that assembling a student body
characterized by racial diversity is a permissible aim of a university
admissions policy. 45 With these provisional premises in place, I now want
to examine the reasoning by which the Court attempted to rationalize its
split decisions in Grutter and Gratz. My aim here is to understand why,
from the vantage point of a principle of equal treatment, there should be an
objection to an admissions body's pursuing the permissible goal of racial
diversity by means of a policy that grants automatic preferences to
applicants who belong to underrepresented minority groups. If we cannot
ultimately make principled sense of any such objection, then we will have
to revisit our provisional assumption.
A.

Background

It will be helpful to review some facts concerning the two admissions
policies that were at issue. The Grutter case involved a challenge to the
admissions policy of the University of Michigan Law School ("the Law
School"). Under that policy, the Law School on average accepted about
34% of the 3,500 applications it received each year -6 to populate an
incoming class of about 350 students.47 In making their decisions about
whether to admit each applicant, admissions officials considered a number
of factors deemed relevant to assessing the applicant's "likely contributions
to the intellectual and social life of the institution' '48 and making sure that
no applicant would be admitted who could not be expected to graduate
from the Law School without serious academic difficulty. 49 These factors
included: the applicant's undergraduate GPA, LSAT score, quality of
undergraduate institution, letters of recommendation, quality of applicant's
written personal statements s ° and applicant's undergraduate course
selection.
The Law School's admissions policy aimed, furthermore, "to achieve
that diversity which has the potential to enrich everyone's education and
thus make a law school class stronger than the sum of its parts." 5' To this

45. Notice that this is not the same as saying that racial diversity is intrinsically
valuable. On our provisional understanding of Justice O'Connor's view, achieving racial
diversity in a student body is a permissible goal that is valued because of its service to the
broader goals of social integration and democratic equality.
46. For the years 1955-2000. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 381 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
47. Id. at313.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Each applicant is required to write a personal statement and an "essay describing
the ways in which the applicant will contribute to the life and diversity of the Law School."
Id. at 338.
51. Id.
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end, admissions officers were permitted to give "substantial weight" to an
applicant's potential "diversity contributions. 5 2 One "type of diversity" to
which the policy was expressly committed was "racial and ethnic diversity
with special reference to the inclusion of students from groups which have
been historically discriminated against, like African-Americans, Hispanics
and Native Americans, who without this commitment might not be
numbers." 53
represented in [the Law School's] student body in meaningful
The Law School sought to enroll a "critical mass" of underrepresented
minority students, i.e., a sufficient number to allow such students to
participate in the classroom without feeling isolated or like "spokespersons
for their race," 54 and to allow for intra-minority diversity, counteracting any
tendency of5 non-minorities to assume the existence of a single "minority
viewpoint., 1
At trial, the Law School never disputed that it gave active, positive
consideration to the race of applicants in making admissions decisions.
Although the Director of Admissions disavowed the use of any explicit
"quotas" or target enrollment percentages for minority students, he
explained that he frequently consulted "daily reports" that tracked the racial
and ethnic composition of the incoming class as it was being populated, to
"ensure that a critical mass of underrepresented minority students would be
reached.,56 According to Law School officials, there was no specific
formula used to determine the weight to be given to an applicant's race
relative to other relevant factors in any given case; indeed, the fact that an
applicant was of a particular race might play "no role" in one case and yet
be "determinative" in another.5 7 The Law School asserted that it needed to
factor the race of applicants into its admissions decisions, because a
"critical mass" of underrepresented minorities could not have been enrolled
if the only factors considered were "hard" variables such as GPA and
LSAT score. 8 This assertion was confirmed by the Law School's
statistical expert, who testified that in the year 2000, only 10% of all
minority applicants who were given offers of admission would have been
admitted if their race had not been considered as a positive factor in the
decision-making process. 59
The Gratz case involved a dispute over the constitutionality of the
admissions policy used by the University of Michigan's College of
Literature, Science and the Arts ("the College"). The College's procedures
for reviewing applications (during the relevant time period) were more
52. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 338.

53. Id.
at 319.
54. Id.
55. Id.at 320, 333 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. at 215a).

56. Id. at318.
57. Id. at319.
58. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318.
at 320.
59. Id.
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formulaic than the Law School's. In deciding whether to admit or reject an
applicant, the College's policy took into account the following factors: 6°
high school GPA, standardized test scores, quality of the applicant's high
school, strength of the applicant's high school curriculum, whether the
applicant was an in-state resident, the applicant's alumni relationships,
strength of the applicant's personal essay, the applicant's personal
achievement or leadership, and various "miscellaneous" factors.
Each
application was rated for these variables and awarded a certain number of
"points" in each category, with a maximum possible score of 150. Of those
150 points, a total of 110 points were possible in the academic categories
and forty in the non-academic ones.62 The disposition of each application
was determined by reference to a "selection index," consisting of a division
of score ranges into several recommended outcomes. According to this
index, scores of 100 and higher called for immediate admission; scores
from ninety to ninety-nine allowed for admission or "postponement" of
decision until a later time (the College used a "rolling" admissions
process); and scores of eighty-nine or lower generally called for other types
of delayed
decisions less likely to end with admission, or outright
63
rejection.
As in the Grutter case, there was no genuine dispute in Gratz that the
College took active and significant account of an applicant's race in
determining whether to admit or reject her. The College's method of doing
so was more formula-driven than the Law School's case-by-case approach.
Under the College's policy, every applicant who qualified as an
underrepresented minority was automatically awarded twenty points under
the "miscellaneous" category of decision factors. 64 The only other
nonacademic factors for which an applicant could receive a comparable
number of points were socioeconomic disadvantage (twenty points),65
"attendance at a predominantly minority or disadvantaged high school"
(twenty points), and athletic recruitment (twenty points). 6 Smaller point
awards were available for other nonacademic factors such as in-state
residence (ten points), alumni relationships (four points), and outstanding
personal achievement, leadership, or public service (five points).67

60. There were numerous variations in the specifies of the College's policy over the
period 1995-2000. See id. at 253.
61. Id. at 253-54.
62. Id. at 277-78 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 254.
64. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 254-55.
65. This factor was only mentioned in Justice Souter's diss-nting opinion. Justice
Souter also noted that 20 points could be awarded to an applicant at the Provost's discretion.
See id. at 295 (Souter, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 278 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
67. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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The Supreme Court's contrasting conclusions in the two cases are
familiar enough that they do no require extended rehearsal here. Briefly:
the Court decided in Grutter that the Law School's policy was
constitutionally permissible under the Equal Protection Clause but ruled in
I have already
Gratz that the College's policy was impermissible.
discussed the main rationale for the positive holding of Grutter - viz.,
Justice O'Connor's argument for assigning the status of compelling state
interest to the value of diversity, including racial diversity in particular.
Following this rationale, the Court held that it was permissible for the Law
68
School to try to achieve a "critical mass" of underrepresented minorities
and, furthermore, that its "individualized" procedure for taking account of
race in the admissions process was narrowly tailored to serve that goal.69
In Gratz, however, a five-Justice majority announced that the College's
policy of "automatically distribut[ing] 20 points, or one-fifth of the points
needed to guarantee admission, to every single 'underrepresented minority'
applicant solely because of race" could not be regarded as narrowly tailored
to achieve "educational diversity" 70 and therefore failed to pass
constitutional muster under strict scrutiny.
What's Wrong with Automatic Racial Preferences?
The Court's opinions clearly indicate that a minority applicant's race
may be considered a reason in favor of admission, but the amount of
preferential advantage attached to race cannot be assigned a fixed,
quantified value that is insensitive to the particular facts presented by each
individual application. This principle suggests that there is something
objectionable about granting all minority applicants a uniform amount of
preference, just in virtue of their racial membership. But this seems, on the
face of it, a rather surprising restriction on policies of race-based
preference. If it is permissible, as a matter of equal treatment, to consider
race as a factor in admissions decisions and to weigh that factor to the
advantage of some minority applicants, on what basis could we say that it
should be impermissible to weigh that same factor to the uniform advantage
of all minority applicants? Why should the Court have thought that a
policy that would (presumably) lead to a less uniform distribution of racebased preference be required as a matter of equal treatment?
Perhaps it will help to remind ourselves of a key passage from Justice
O'Connor's Grutter opinion: "When using race as a 'plus' factor in
university admissions, a university's admissions program must remain
flexible enough to ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an individual
B.

68.
69.
70.

See Grutter,539 U.S. at 316.
Id. at 334.
Gratz, 539 U. S. at 270.
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and not in a way that makes an7applicant's race or ethnicity the defining
feature of his or her application." 1
Since the constraining principle here is supposed to be the Equal
Protection Clause, we must understand the Court to be stating that an
admissions policy that grants preferences to minority applicants without
considering each of those applicants "as an individual" is offensive to the
idea of equal treatment. On this view, equal treatment demands that every
applicant be considered on facts specific to her own case, rather than in
such a way that the applicant's racial status becomes the predominant or
decisive consideration in deciding whether to admit or deny her.
An immediate difficulty is that the notions of treating each applicant
"as an individual" and of race not being made to be the "defining" or
"decisive" feature of an individual's application are themselves far from
self-interpreting and even farther from having any obvious normative force.
Furthermore, when we try to unpack these ideas in the most obvious ways,
they become even more suspect as candidates for genuine requirements of
equal treatment and hence only tend to obscure rather than clarify the
purported distinction between the policies at issue in the two cases.
Let us first consider the second idea - the proscription against
allowing race to become the "defining" or "decisive" feature of an
individual's application. What might it be for an individual's race to be the
defining or decisive aspect of her application? One possible interpretation
is that race becomes the defining feature of an application when the
magnitude of the effect given to consideration of race reaches a certain
maximum level relative to the other aspects of that application. If we
accepted this reading, we could say that the reason that the Court found the
Law School's program to be permissible while it found the College's
impermissible is that the Law School's policy allowed consideration of
race to have an effect that stayed below the maximum level, while the
magnitude of that effect under the College's policy exceeded it. Putting it
roughly, one might say that the crucial problem for the College's policy
was that it made race matter too much.
Whether we ought to accept this view depends, of course, upon a more
precise articulation of what it would be for a policy to make race "matter
too much." We certainly cannot restate the idea in terms of keeping the
absolute or relative number of minority admissions below a certain level.
As the Court says in characterizing the impermissibility of a system that
implements racial quotas: "that would amount to outright racial balancing,
which is patently unconstitutional. 72 A more promising approach might
71. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336-37. Justice O'Connor is here borrowing directly, of
course, from Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318 n.52 (arguing
that a policy of racial preference, to be permissible, must "treat[] each applicant as an
individual" and that "[t]he denial.., of this right to individualized consideration" is the
principal constitutional infirmity of a quota- or set-aside-based program).
72. Grutter,539 U.S. at 329 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307).
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be to try to specify what it means for race to matter too much as a function
of how likely it is that the consideration of race under a given policy will
have affected the outcome of any given decision to admit or deny a
minority applicant. We can imagine two limiting cases. In the limiting
case where consideration of race matters for naught, every minority
applicant who is admitted under the policy in question would also have
been admitted absent consideration of race. In the opposite limiting case
where race matters maximally, every minority applicant who would have
been rejected absent consideration of race is admitted under the policy in
question. The closer a given admissions policy is to the maximal case in its
treatment of race, the more it can be thought to treat race as the
predominant, "defining," or "decisive" feature of applications filed by
minorities.
Given this proposed clarification, is it plausible to conjecture that the
basis for the Court's decisions was that it believed that race mattered too
much under the College's policy and, by contrast, mattered sufficiently
little under the Law School's policy? There is very little in the Court's
opinions that would support any such claim. The Law School's own expert
witness testified that giving positive consideration to applicants' minority
status had a "very dramatic" effect on the numbers of minority students
admitted, estimating that only ten percent of such students who actually
were admitted would still have been admitted had their minority status not
been taken into account.7 3 This seems a far cry from the limiting case
where consideration of race matters for naught. It might nevertheless be
true, of course, that race mattered less under the Law School's policy than
under the College's (though the Court's opinions themselves do not
provide sufficient information to determine this);74 but even if this were so,
a marginal difference of this sort could not provide the basis for any
principled distinction between their policies. Given how substantial a role
the consideration of race appears to have played in the admission of
minorities under the Law School's policy, it is implausible to interpret the
proscription against allowing race to be the defining feature of an
individual's application as a curb on the likelihood that consideration of an
applicant's race will determine the outcome of the decision whether to
admit or deny her.
Perhaps it should have been obvious from the start that trying to come
up with a sensible specification of what it means in this context for race to
matter too much would be an unfruitful endeavor. If we presume that
73. Id. at 320. The expert's analysis was based on admissions figures for the year
2000.
74. The College asserted in its briefs, however, that without consideration of race or
ethnicity, the number of minority students admitted would "drop precipitously, leaving most
of [the College's] learning contexts with very few minority students, or none at all."
Respondents' Brief in Conditional Opposition to CertiorariBefore Judgment at 9, Gratz
(No. 02-516).
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institutions adopt policies of race-based preference only when race-blind
selection procedures result in inadequate diversity yields, it should hardly
be surprising that when we examine admissions outcomes under
affirmative action programs, we find that racial preference is having a
considerable impact on who is being admitted. If we did not find this that is, if consideration of race under an affirmative action program were
not having "decisive" effects for a substantial number of minority
applicants - then we should conclude that either the program was
ineffectual or must not have been necessary in the first place. It seems to
me difficult, therefore, to take seriously the claim that a policy of racebased preference is permissible only if it stops short of making race a
defining or decisive factor for minority admissions.
This leads me to think that the significance of the admonition that race
not be made a defining feature of minority applications must ultimately
devolve upon what originally may have looked to be a separate
prescription: the requirement - pedigreed by Justice Powell's Bakke
opinion - that a policy of race-based preference evaluate every minority
applicant "as an individual." So let us see what can be made of this notion.
The basic question, to repeat, concerns how it could make sense to
think that a problem of equal treatment arises when a uniform advantage is
granted to all individuals who are minority applicants, and why the Court
should have thought that this problem could be remedied by adopting a
policy of "individualized consideration" that "demands that race be used in
a flexible, nonmechanical way,, 76 given that such a policy could be
expected to make the distribution of race-based preference less uniform
over the class of minority applicants.
One response may seem ready at hand: the question is misleading
because the fact that a policy provides for the uniform distribution of
advantage within a given group is no reason to recommend it as a matter of
equal treatment. To the contrary, one might argue, the constitutional norm
of equal treatment is violated when all members of a group are treated the
same just in virtue of their membership in that group. One might say that
this is because making determinations on the basis of group classifications
is bound to result in treating equals unequally, since such classifications
inevitably mask relevant differences among members of the class; and this
unfairness can be avoided only if every individual is evaluated on his or her
own merits. Thus, according to this argument, what equal treatment
requires of an admissions policy is that it evaluate the admissibility of
75.

Justice Souter, responding to Chief Justice Rehnquist's suggestion that an

admissions policy cannot permissibly make race a "decisive" factor in minority admissions,
makes a related point in his dissenting opinion: "The very nature of a college's permissible
practice of awarding value to racial diversity means that race must be considered in a way
that increases some applicants' chances for admission." Gratz, 539 U.S. at 295 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).

76.

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334.
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every student on the specific facts presented by her application, rather than
on the basis of generalizations about certain groups into which she may
happen to fall.
This line of argument, however, surely proves too much. It is hard to
see how any particular fact presented by an individual application could
have any significance apart from its suitability as the basis of some
judgment generalizable to other applicants who present that same fact.7
Thus, for example, the decisional relevance of the fact that an applicant
was the president of her high school student council depends on the
availability of some general judgment regarding the qualities of individuals
who are presidents of their high school student councils. To consider an
item on an individual's application as a positive qualification for admission
seems to imply some general positive judgment regarding the class of
individuals whose applications present that same item (other things equal,
of course). It follows that whatever evaluating an applicant "as an
individual" could mean, its prescriptive force cannot derive from the
impermissibility of drawing inferences about the applicant's admissibility
based on general judgments about the various groups within which she
might be classifiable.
The obvious rejoinder is that racial classifications are different,
insofar as there are no inferences about an applicant's admissibility that
can be drawn from her membership in a particular racial group. This point
surely can be granted - it is reflected as a matter of law in the established
doctrine of racial classifications as automatically "suspect" and
necessitating "strict scrutiny" - but we have already crossed that bridge.
Indeed, this is what makes the Court's contrasting holdings in Grutter and
Gratz so puzzling. The question we have been addressing is, given the
Court's conclusion in Grutter that it is constitutionally permissible for an
admissions policy to give positive consideration to an applicant's
classifiability as a racial minority, why should it be impermissible to give
such consideration a uniform beneficial effect to all applicants who are so
classifiable? To put it another way, we might agree (arguendo) that the
idea of equal treatment embodies some form of a requirement of
individualized consideration (e.g., related to the idea of treating equals
equally 78), but once we have decided that consideration of race is
permissible in the context of university admissions - thus having
presumably overcome the standing assumption that one's classifiability as a
member of a particular race has no proper bearing on how one should be
treated - it seems like illogical backtracking to then continue to insist that
consideration of race must be individualized because of the inherent
suspectness or irrelevance of racial classifications.
77. Cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT 125-26 (1999) (arguing that equal treatment does not preclude the use of
classificatory judgments, and "almost all classifications involve 'groups').
78. I discuss this idea further infra, Section III.B.
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C. What Does Individualized ConsiderationRequire?
But the difficulties do not end here. Even waiving any objection to
the premise that individualized consideration is a requirement of equal
treatment, there is still the further problem of trying to specify just what an
admissions procedure must do in order to satisfy that requirement. The
Gratz Court's suggestion that in order for an admissions policy to be
regarded as making use of race in the "nonmechanical," "flexible" way that
individualized consideration requires, the policy must take into
consideration "each characteristic of a particular applicant., 79 But this is
hardly a workable proposition. The Court could not plausibly have
intended that every applicant be treated as though she presents a fixed or
determinate number of "characteristics" in addition to her race, each of
which must somehow be factored into the decision-making process. In the
context of an admissions policy, it makes sense only to speak of the
characteristics of an applicant that are relevant to a decision; and these
characteristics are simply given by whatever (legally permissible)
desiderata the institution sets for its individual students or for the
composition of its student body as a whole.
Nor could the Court have meant to say that there are certain
identifiable characteristics of applicants that an admissions policy must take
into account as a matter of equal treatment. Presumably, it would be
constitutionally permissible for a university to make its admissions
decisions solely on the basis of some index determined exclusively by an
applicant's GPA and her standardized test scores.80 One might question the
social value, justness, or the fairness of such a policy, but it seems doubtful
that the Grutter Court should have intended that individuals would have a
claim under the Equal Protection Clause that the policy take other
characteristics into account. But if we assume that the idea of taking "each
characteristic of an applicant" into account is not supposed to rule out the
permissibility of an admissions policy limited solely to consideration of
grades and test scores, it is hard to see what content we could ascribe to the
idea at all.
Another way that one might try to interpret the idea of racial
preference based on individualized consideration is in terms of some
concept of "suitability" (for lack of a better term), under which positive
effect would be given to a minority applicant's race only in "suitable" cases
i.e., only where the other features of the individual's application made
consideration of her race appropriate. This proposal may have some
surface appeal. But, for one thing, it does not appear to be what the Court
had in mind. What the proposed interpretation suggests is that the
permissibility of using race as a positive consideration is conditional upon
79. Gratz, 539 U. S. at 271.
80. So long, of course, as this was not done for the purpose of racial discrimination.
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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the presence of certain other qualifying characteristics in an individual's
application. But the Court's statements about the permissibility of racebased preference simply are not couched in these conditional terms.
Indeed, what the Court explicitly says is that an admissions policy may
consider "race or ethnicity... as a 'plus' factor in the context of
individualized consideration of each and every applicant."8' The most
natural reading of this language seems contrary to the proposed conditional
reading. Moreover, Justice O'Connor's broad discussion in Grutter of the
value of diversity contains no hint that only individuals meeting certain
non-racially defined criteria should be thought capable of contributing to a
community's racial diversity. One might argue that a good admissions
policy should also consider those other criteria, such that any applicant
who satisfied them would be regarded as preferable to one who did not,
ceteris paribus. But even if we accepted this argument (although it is
difficult to see any constitutional reason to do so), it simply would not
follow that there is something objectionable about using a formula that
assigns a uniform weighting to race across all applicants. Thus, although
we can undoubtedly read the Court's decision as holding that the granting
of race-based preference must be conditioned upon individualized
consideration, it does not seem to me plausible to interpret the notion of
individualized consideration as requiring that race-based preference be
conditioned on the presence of other factors.
Ultimately, it seems to me that if we assume that racial diversity is a
constitutionally permissible aim, it is going to be difficult to draw any
normatively meaningful distinction between a policy that takes
consideration of race in an "automatic" way versus one that does so by
means of a case-by-case determination. As I have already argued, every
efficacious affirmative action program will make race a decisive, but-for
cause of the favorable disposition of some group of minority applicants.
The choice between a policy of automatic preference and one of case-bycase evaluation merely represents a choice as to whether the selection of
that group should be made on an ex ante basis or on the basis of
contemporaneous evaluation. A policy of automatic preference will make
that determination ex ante, based on predictive judgments about the
expected quality of the applicant pool and the magnitude of preference
necessary to achieve the desired racial diversity, i.e., a "critical mass, 8 2 of
minority students who might otherwise be underrepresented. A policy of
case-by-case evaluation will make the determination on a rolling basis,
perhaps contemporaneously with the actual review of individual
applications. But even under such a policy, the decision as to when an
admissions officer should take consideration of an applicant's race so as to
tip the disposition of her application toward acceptance is surely not left to

81.
82.

Grutter, 539 U. S. at 334 (emphasis added).
Id. at 333.
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unbridled discretion. There will have to be some set of working standards
or guidelines that govern that decision, particularly if the applicant pool is
very large and not every application gets reviewed by every admissions
officer. Any such working guidelines, no less than a formal policy that
automates the process, must be based on predictions about how
aggressively applicants' minority status should be weighted in order for the
incoming class to be populated with the desired "critical mass" of
otherwise underrepresented groups. It is difficult to see how the operation
of any such guidelines could be thought to differ materially from the
application of a policy that simply makes these same sorts of predictive
judgment ex ante. If the goal is racial diversity, then unless matters are to
be left to chance, individualized consideration must at some point give way
to regularizing bird's-eye determinations of how much aggregate
preferential treatment will be necessary, as a matter of logistics, to achieve
the desired goal.
It will help at this juncture to take a step or two back and remind
ourselves of the basic question which we are supposing that Gratz and
Grutter addressed. Doctrinal complexities aside, one might have thought
that the central question was about the constitutional permissibility of an
admissions policy under which an applicant's being a member of an
underrepresented racial minority group counts as a relevant reason, at least
pro tanto, for admitting that applicant. It seems reasonable to believe this
question was given an affirmative answer in Grutter: if racial diversity is a
compelling state interest, then surely an individual's race can be a relevant
reason for admitting her. The Court did hold, after all, that it was
permissible for the Law School to take the race of its minority applicants
into account as a positive consideration in deciding whether to admit or
reject them.
But if a minority applicant's race can be counted as a relevant reason
(pro tanto) for admitting her, this means that given two applicants, A and B,
who are identical except for the fact that A belongs to a racial minority
group and B does not, it must at least be permissible for a university to
adopt a policy under which A is admitted due to consideration of her race,
while B is rejected.8 3 This is implicit in the idea of some consideration
being a relevant reason for admitting or rejecting an applicant.
Having stated the upshot of Grutter in this way, we can see more
clearly the source of our puzzlement about the Court's hand-wringing over
the need for individualized consideration. For if we assume that the Court
83. This "tie-breaking" model represents one of the weakest forms of affirmative
action. See STEVEN CAHN, Introduction to THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE xiii (2d ed.
2002). Stronger forms of preference are of course possible (e.g., in which minority status
counts as a reason to admit one individual over another individual who is otherwise better
qualified), but if my arguments below are correct in what they conclude about the
implications of Grutter and Gratz for the weaker form, then they should (afortiori)also go
through for the stronger forms.
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held in Grutter that the race of an applicant can be counted as a relevant
reason for giving preference to her admission over the admission of an
otherwise identical non-minority applicant, it seems incongruous to insist
that a policy's granting of such a preference not be keyed predominantly to
the race of applicants: giving decisive effect to consideration of race is
precisely what constitutes the preference. Relatedly, if an applicant's being
a minority can be a relevant reason for admitting her, it seems inapt to
object to a policy on the grounds that it makes race too "decisive" or makes
it matter too much. If race can be regarded as a relevant reason for
preferring one applicant over another, one might think that the question of
how much weight that factor can be given should no more raise a question
of equal treatment than the question of how much weight can be assigned
to other considerations that are less controversially regarded as decisionally
relevant, such as grades, test scores, special talents, and so forth. And even
less should it raise a question of equal treatment that a policy assigns a
fixed value to the positive effect of race based on ex ante determinations of
what will be necessary to achieve the desired levels of racial diversity. As
Justice Souter writes:
Since college admission is not left entirely to inarticulate
intuition, it is hard to see what is inappropriate in assigning some
stated value to a relevant characteristic, whether it be reasoning
ability, writing style, running speed, or minority race.... The
college simply does by a numbered scale what the law school
accomplishes in its "holistic review." 4

III. THE "MONET OBJECTION"
At this point, I think we are forced to ask whether there is something
wrong with the provisional assumption with which we began Section II namely, that racial diversity is a compelling state interest and so a
permissible aim of university admissions policies. Perhaps this assumption
is less secure than we may originally have thought.
Indeed, there is a strand of reasoning in Grutter and Gratz involving
the requirement of individualized consideration that stands in direct conflict
with the notion that an applicant's race, as such, can be a relevant reason to
favor her admission. This strand of reasoning opens up the possibility of
reading the cases in a way that is far less accommodating to the value of
racial diversity than my discussion to this point has been assuming. In
order to understand this reading, we must examine an objection to policies
involving automatic race-based preferences that I will call the "Monet
objection."

84.

Gratz, 539 U. S. at 295 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Monet and the Minority
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in Gratz, sets up the
objection by drawing on an hypothetical example originating from Justice
Powell's opinion in Bakke:
[Suppose that] the Admissions Committee, with only a few
places left to fill, [found] itself forced to choose between A, the
child of a successful black physician in an academic community
with promise of superior academic performance, and B, a black
who grew up in an inner-city ghetto of semi-literate parents
whose academic achievement was lower but who had
demonstrated energy and leadership... [and] C, a white student
with extraordinary artistic talent.85
The Chief Justice then describes the "problematic nature" of the
College's affirmative action policy by discussing how each of these
hypothetical students would fare under it:
[E]ven if student C's "extraordinary artistic talent" rivaled that of
Monet or Picasso, the applicant would receive, at most, five
points under the [College's] system.... At the same time, every
single underrepresented minority applicant, including students A
and B, would automatically receive 20 points for submitting an
application. Clearly, the [College's] system does not offer
applicants [an] individualized selection process .... Instead of
considering how the differing backgrounds, experiences and
characteristics of students A, B, and C might benefit the
University, admissions counselors reviewing [College]
applications would simply award both A and B 20 points because
their applications indicate that they are African-American, and
student 6C would receive up to 5 points for his "extraordinary
8
talent."
The point of this objection presumably is not meant to depend merely
on an outright substantive judgment that Monet-caliber artistic talents
ought to be valued on a par with racial diversity. No such judgment could,
in any event, plausibly be considered a constitutional requirement of equal
treatment.
The point, rather, is supposed to be that the College's policy is
internally inconsistent: it automatically grants a substantial number of
"points" to minority applicants based on their race, ostensibly on the
assumption that these individuals will make contributions to student body
diversity. Yet, at the same time, the policy awards a much smaller,
relatively insignificant number of points to non-minority applicants who (ex
hypothesi) possess characteristics embodying comparable or even greater
85. Id. at 272-73 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324 (Powell, J.)).
86.

Gratz, 539 U.S. at 273.
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"diversity contributions," simply on the basis of their status as nonminorities. Thus, according to this objection, the College's policy fails to
give commensurate consideration to the diversity contributions of
minorities and non-minorities alike. And since the relevance of race is
supposed to be derivative of the value of diversity, the significance of an
applicant's diversity contribution cannot be made to depend on her
minority racial status. Or so the argument goes.
It should be clear that the Monet objection depends upon a conception
of diversity similar to the one described by Justice Powell in Bakke8 7 - a
conception under which the value of a diverse student body derives wholly
from its enlivening effect on intra-institutional discourse and other benefits
realized within the context of the academic enterprise.8 8 It is remarkable,
then, that Justice O'Connor in her Grutter opinion simply seems to accept
the Monet objection on the Chief Justice's terms. Given how significantly
Justice O'Connor's account of the value of diversity 9 departs from Justice
Powell's view, one might have expected her to resist the objection, perhaps
criticizing it for presupposing the wrong definition of diversity. Or she
might have pointed out that, even on Justice Powell's view, the requirement
of individualized consideration did not imply that all diversity contributions
had to be regarded as fungible and hence weighted equally.90
But Justice O'Connor does neither of these things. Instead, she takes
objection seriously. In fact, it seems that it is precisely because
Monet
the
she assumes that the Monet objection is well-taken on the facts of Gratz
that she emphasizes the "flexible" and "highly individualized" nature of the
Law School's policy, taking pains to assert that it, unlike the College's
policy, allowed for the individualized consideration of all applicants and
gave "substantial weight to diversity factors besides race." 91 The following
assertion by Justice O'Connor, for example, seems almost a complete and
explicit concession to the validity of the Chief Justice's objection:
"[b]ecause the Law School considers 'all pertinent elements of diversity,' it
can (and does) select nonminority applicants who have greater potential to
enhance student body diversity over underrepresented minority
applicants., 92 This rationalization of the Law School's policy suggests
that, in fact, the diversity contributions of non-minority applicants which, presumably, would primarily fall under the category of Bakke-style
discourse benefits - are fungible with the diversity contributions of
minority applicants, implying that the value of the diversity contributions
of each group inheres in some common benefit that they produce. But this
would mean that the relevance of an applicant's race is not founded in the
87. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315.
88. See Lee, supra note 14, at 2305-06; Post, supra note 4, at 59-60.
89. See Grutter,539 U.S. at 328-34.
90. See supra text accompanying note 7.
91. Grutter, 539 U. S. at 336-39.
92.

Id. at 341.
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distinct value of racial diversity, but in the value of some more general
form of diversity, a kind of diversity to which minority and non-minority
applicants can make commensurable contributions. I believe that it is
largely this view of diversity engendered by the Monet objection that drives
the Court's insistence on the doctrinal requirement of individualized
consideration. Once we drop the assumption that racial diversity is a
permissible constitutional aim, it becomes clear why a policy of automatic
preference keyed to applicants' race should be thought problematic as a
matter of equal treatment: individualized consideration is needed to ensure
the similar treatment of minority and non-minority applicants with similar
potential to make a diversity contribution.
B.The Implications of Objections from Formal Inequality
To understand more fully the implications of Justice O'Connor's
acceptance of the Monet objection, I want to take a closer look at its
analytical and logical structure. By doing so, I believe we can better
appreciate precisely what it entails.
The Monet objection is, at bottom, a complaint of formal inequality.
Its argument takes the general structure of asserting that some action x
ought to be done to Q because x was done to P, and Q is similar in relevant
respects to P. Or, alternatively: other things equal, x ought to be done to Q
because x was done to P on the basis of some consideration c, and this
same consideration is present in the case of Q. The complaint that an
action violates a norm of formal inequality can be powerful because its
force seems to depend only on some requirement of logical consistency
rather than on a substantive justification of the action in question. Insofar
as the Monet objection fits this form, it gets its grip on us by suggesting
that, whatever our substantive political or moral commitments, we should
agree that the policy invalidated in Gratz was objectionable as a matter of
logic: if a policy grants preferential treatment to minority applicants on the
basis of their potential diversity contributions, consistency demands that it
should also provide for comparable treatment with respect to non-minority
applicants who present similar potential.
But, like any other claim of formal inequality, the normative
plausibility of the Monet objection depends on prior substantive premises.
It is often argued that assertions of formal equality that depend on some
precept in the nature of "like cases ought to be treated alike" are empty or
tautologous.93 Whether this strong claim about the emptiness of the precept
can be defended is open to further inquiry,94 but we can agree, at least, that
93. See, e.g., PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY 186-94 (1990); Craig Carr, The
Concept of FormalJustice, 39 PHIL. STUD. 211, 212 (1981); J.R. Lucas, Against Equality, in
JUSTICE AND EQUALITY 139-41 (Hugo Bedau ed., 1971); cf Christopher J. Peters, Equality
Revisited, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1210 (1997).
94. For the view that the formal precept does have independent content, see, for
example, Kent Greenawalt, How Empty Is the Idea of Equality?, 83 CoLuM. L. REV. 1167,

1170-78 (1983); see also Kent Greenawalt, "PrescriptiveEquality": Two Steps Forward,
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claims about actions that are required as a matter of formal equality always
depend for their normative purchase on further principles that determine
and constrain the sorts of considerations that can count as reasons, and
these further principles will involve substantive moral or political
judgments. 9' Thus, the mandate that like individuals ought not be treated
differently is vacuous absent substantive principles that specify what count
as relevant similarities in respect of individuals and of treatments. This
idea is, to be sure, a familiar one. 96 We can say, generally, that the claim
that doing x to P but not Q is objectionable because it violates formal
equality of treatment presupposes the substantive premise that for every
consideration relating to P that provides a reason for doing x to P, there is a
similar consideration relating to Q that provides equal reason for doing x to
Q.97 So, for example, suppose Smith is given a job promotion but Jones is
denied one. A complaint by Jones that this differential action is
objectionable because it constitutes formally unequal treatment
presupposes that every consideration that can be cited in favor of
promoting Smith applies equally in favor of promoting Jones: i.e., the two
are similar in all respects relevant to being promoted.
But whether a given similarity or difference between two individuals
counts as relevant in a given context can only be determined by reference
to principles that have legitimate institutional authority in that context.
Thus, in addition to presupposing positive claims about the relevant
similarity of affected individuals, assertions of formal inequality of
treatment also necessarily imply negative claims about substantive
institutional principles. Specifically, such assertions imply that there is no

110 HARV. L. REV. 1265 (1997). Kenneth W. Simons also provides a number of
illuminating insights into the content and structure of equality-based norms in his article,
The Logic of EgalitarianNorms, 80 B.U. L. REv. 693 (2000).
95. Cf R.M. Hare, Relevance, in VALUES AND MORALS: ESSAYS INHONOR OF WILLIAM
FRANKENA, CHARLES STEVENSON, &RICHARD BRANDT 75 (Alvin Goldman & Jaegwon Kim
eds., 1978).
96. See, e.g., Bernard Williams, The Idea of Equality, in EQUALITY: SELECTED
READINGS 91-92 (Louis Pojman & Robert Westmoreland eds., 1997); JOHN RAwLs, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 208-09 (rev ed. 1999); William Frankena, The Concept of Social Justice,
in SOCIAL JUSTICE 8-11 (Richard Brandt ed., 1962); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
155 (1961).
97. Notice that the claim of formal inequality of treatment does not necessarily imply
that there actually is some consideration that provides reason for doing x; it implies only the
conditional claim that if there is reason for doing x to P, then there is also reason for doing x
to Q. This makes it possible to assert that doing x to P but not Q constitutes formal
inequality of treatment, without necessarily implying that there is good independent reason
for doing x to P. Thus, for example, Chief Justice Rehnquist can assert that it constitutes
formal inequality to credit the diversity contributions of minority applicants while not
crediting the diversity contributions of non-minority applicants, without necessarily
accepting the premise that we have good independent reason to credit the diversity
contributions of minority applicants.
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legitimate institutionalprinciple that could justify treating the individuals
differently in respect of the action at issue.
For example, the assertion that giving a promotion to Smith but not to
Jones is objectionable on grounds of formal inequality implies not just that
Smith and Jones are relevantly similar in some abstract pre-institutional
sense, but that there is no legitimate institutional principle under which
there could be reason for promoting Smith but not Jones.98 Notice that it
follows from this that Jones's complaint of formal inequality would be
obviated if it could be established that there is some such legitimate
principle. We might imagine the employer responding to Jones, for
example, by explaining that he only had the resources to promote one
employee at the time he promoted Smith. Such a response would meet
Jones's claim of formal inequality of treatment insofar as it posits a
principle - namely, some principle that insufficiency of resources is a
reason for granting a promotion to one employee but denying it to another
equally qualified one - under which the employer could have been
justified in promoting Smith but not Jones, despite their similarity
qualifications-wise.
Of course, in any given factual scenario, it will usually be trivial to rig
an ad hoc principle under which there is sufficient reason for doing x to P
but not Q,'9 so all of the critical weight must be borne by the concept of
"legitimacy." The legitimacy of a proposed principle that would reconcile
the possibility of treating P and Q differently in respect of doing x (even
though they share some or many characteristics relevant to x-ing) is
ultimately a matter of identifying the values that are embedded in the
institutional contexts in which a dispute arises. In the affirmative action
debate, the relevant institutional context is set by an overlapping mix of
different social structures: universities acting to determine the composition
of their own student bodies, the institution of higher education generally,
the various practices by which desirable career opportunities are distributed
and professional status attained in our society, and the legal framework
given by anti-discrimination law and the Constitution.
In the arena of constitutional argument, we can think of the task of
identifying "legitimate" principles as corresponding with the "compelling
interest" part of the strict scrutiny test as standardly understood. The point
of the compelling interest inquiry is to ensure that the principles that
determine the kinds of considerations that count as reasons for treating
certain individuals differently from others are derived from values
consistent with the Constitution that are genuinely embodied in our various
social institutions and to which we assign the highest order of priority.
98.

Since the example involves an employment matter, the relevant institutional

principles here would presumably be the principles governing employer-employee relations
and the laws governing employment discrimination.
99. For example, in the case of Smith and Jones, one could rig this principle: having a
name starting with the letter "j"is a consideration that counts against receiving a promotion.
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To say, therefore, that a certain challenged classification of individuals
serves a compelling state interest is to say that there is some legitimate
principle under which certain considerations could provide reasons for
doing something with respect to individuals of one class while not doing it
with respect to individuals of another class. And - importantly for my
discussion below - if there is some legitimate principle that justifies the
differential treatment of two classes, this obviates any complaints of formal
inequality based on claims that individuals of the two classes are relevantly
similar or that there is some overriding reason for treating them the same.
For to insist on these latter claims is just to deny that any legitimate
principle justifying the differential treatment at issue can be identified.
The Monet objection, as I have construed it, is a complaint of formal
inequality. It asserts that the College's policy in Gratz treated applicants
unequally insofar as it conferred an advantage on minority applicants on
the basis of their potential to make diversity contributions yet withheld any
comparable advantage from non-minority applicants who also
demonstrated such potential. But if what I have said about claims of
formal inequality is right, then the Monet objection presupposes the
substantive claim that there is no legitimate principle under which an
admissions body could be justified in conferring an advantage upon a
minority applicant based on her expected diversity contribution over a nonminority applicant who shows the potential to make a comparable
contribution. If there is no such legitimate principle, then afortiorithere is
no principle under which the distinct value of racial diversity might
provide justification for the differential treatment of minority and nonminority applicants. It follows, moreover, that achieving racial diversity
cannot be a compelling interest for constitutional purposes. For if it were,
then there would be a legitimate principle under which such differential
treatment could be justified.
Justice O'Connor's apparent acceptance of the Monet objection,
therefore, stands in direct conflict with her account of the value of
diversity.' °0 On the one hand, her Grutter opinion suggests that the form of
diversity in which there is a constitutionally compelling state interest
consists in, or at least includes, racial diversity. On the other hand, her
insistence on the doctrinal requirement of individualized consideration in
order to accommodate (and even embrace) the Monet objection suggests
that racial diversity is not itself a compelling interest, and that only some
form of discourse-enhancing diversity is constitutionally cognizable. To
the extent that the latter position seems to carry the day in Gratz, and
insofar as Justice O'Connor's account of the value of racialdiversity is not
actually necessary to the outcome of Grutter, it quickly becomes unclear
whether the cases ought to be read to support the conclusion that racial
diversity is a compelling state interest. Indeed, even if one wants to say
100.

See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328-34.

456

UNIVERSITY OFDETROIT MERCYLA WREVIEW

[Vol. 82:431

that Grutter calls for agnosticism on the matter, Gratz does seem most
amenable to precisely the opposite conclusion: racial diversity is not a
compelling interest.
An alternative interpretation is to read Grutter as holding that there is
indeed a compelling state interest in achieving racial diversity in student
populations, but that because of the Monet objection and the holding of
Gratz, it is nevertheless impermissible to aim directly at it by using devices
like automatic preferences keyed to race. I0 ' I do not think that such an
interpretation is altogether implausible, at least if what we are concerned
about is figuring out what the Court actually had in mind. But whatever its
merits as an explanation of what the Court subjectively intended, the point I
emphasize is that it is difficult to see how any such alternative holding
could be justified on the basis of a principle of equal treatment. Pragmatic
considerations aside (such as fear of propagating racially divisive
policies10 2 ), if there truly is a compelling interest in achieving racial
diversity in our institutions of higher education, I do not think that it makes
much sense, and certainly no sense as a matter of equal treatment, to
require that we approach the pursuit of diversity as though race was
"simply one element in a potentially infinite universe of differences."' 0 3
IV. BACK TO BAKKE
In this last section, I offer a bit of summary and a few diagnostic
thoughts on Justice O'Connor's seemingly contradictory stances in Grutter
and Gratz. In her Grutter discussion of the value of diversity, the Justice
pointed out two categories of benefits: (1) benefits realized in the form of
enhanced discourse within the educational institution, 1°4 and (2) benefits
that are realized in the form of social goods that characterize a wellfunctioning democracy, such as racial integration at all levels of society
and equal participation by all citizens in the various aspects of our shared
civic life.' 5 If the good of diversity is located in the first category of
benefits, then there is no obvious reason to think that the diversity we have
reason to establish in the educational context should be defined as having
101. An additional pressure in this direction might be the general proscription against
"racial balancing," which is invoked by the Court in Grutter. See Grutter,539 U.S. at 32934 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 ). On the other hand, given the Court's explicit holding
that it was permissible for the Law School to aim at populating its incoming class with a
"critical mass" of underrepresented minority students, see Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318, it is
unclear how much force that proscription could be thought to have as against the legitimate
pursuit of racial diversity (if it were a compelling interest).
102. See Post, supra note 4, at 73-74.
103. Id.at 70.
104. See Grutter, 539 U. S. at 329-30 (pointing to the benefits of "livelier" "classroom
discussion" and better "learning outcomes" (citations omitted)).
105. Id. at 330-31 ("Effective participation by members of all racial and ethnic groups
in the civic life of our Nation is essential if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be
realized.").
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race as an essential component. On this model of the value of diversity, an
applicant's race might still be relevant to determining the "diversity
contribution" she could be expected to make, but only as an indirect
predictor,as a contingent or statistical correlate of the incremental benefit
that she could bring to the community of discourse. 10 6 Once we think of
the relevance of race in this way - as an indirect proxy for discoursethe insistence upon the importance of
enhancing potential' 0 7 individualized inquiry becomes somewhat easier to understand. For if race
is only indirectly predictive of diversity in the sense of being contingently
correlated to it, 0 one might expect that in some cases, the presence of
other known factors might make race less predictive or non-predictive, or
that race might have predictive value with respect to an applicant's
diversity contribution only in conjunction with the consideration of other
variables. 0 9
But if the good of diversity consists in or at least includes the second
category of benefits, it would then make sense to think of the diversity we
have reason to establish in the educational context as being at least partly
constituted by racial heterogeneity. On this account, an applicant's race
would be relevant not just as a predictorof her "diversity contribution," but
106. It is interesting to consider, for whatever it may be worth, the wording that
Justice's O'Connor uses in one of the passages where she contrasts the Law School's policy
with the College's. The Law School's policy, she argues, takes race into consideration in a
way that allows for "nuanced judgmaents with respect to the contributions each applicant is
likely to make to the diversity of the incoming class." Gratz, 539 U.S. at 279 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring (emphasis added)). The idea that a nuanced judgment would be necessary to
determine the "likely" contribution of a minority applicant to an incoming class is strongly
suggestive that the applicant's race is at best a contingent correlate or predictor of her
expected diversity contribution.
107. For an argument that the diversity rationale of Bakke has precisely this implication,
see Eugene Volokh, Diversity, Race as Proxy, and Religion as Proxy, 43 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
2059, 2062 (1996) (claiming that the diversity rationale for affirmative action "openly
embraces" the use of race as a proxy). Cf also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., To Each According to

His Ability, from None According to His Race: the Concept of Merit in the Law of
Antidiscrimination, 60 B.U. L. REV. 815, 873-74 (1980) (suggesting that the relevance of
race under Justice Powell's Bakke opinion depends on the assumption that "race - a factor
of no general social worth - contingently but legitimately evidences a superior capacity to
further compelling interests [namely, the enhancement of discourse] in a particular
institutional context").
108. This discussion may raise, for some, questions about how race ought to be
conceptualized in the first place. See generally Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law
and Economics of CriticalRace Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1769-77 (2003) (canvassing
some of the possibilities). I offer no view of the matter here.
109. On this kind of view, the connection between race and expected diversity
contribution might be analogous to something like the connection between standardized test
scores and expected academic performance: test scores might generally be predictive of
academic performance, but that correlation might be very weak in cases, say, where the
applicant's test scores are low but her GPA is very high. For example, one might imagine
that an applicant's race might fail as a predictor of discourse-enhancing character in cases
where the applicant is known to be extremely shy. (I owe this example to Tim Scanlon.)
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as a direct constituent of it. If we think of race and diversity as being
constitutively related in this way, then the doctrinal requirement of
individualized consideration seems to lose any normative grip it might have
had on us (at least as a matter of equal treatment). No "nuanced
judgment,"'" 0 after all, is required to determine whether an individual of a
particular race will contribute to the racial diversity of the incoming class.
All that is needed is some prediction of how the numbers would work out
absent the use of racial preferences.
The Monet objection, as I have described it, depends on the first
model of the value of diversity. It says that if the point of establishing
diversity is to enhance the quality of discourse in the classroom, then it
makes no sense to key preferences, in the name of diversity, rigidly to the
race of applicants. But from the perspective of Justice O'Connor's account
of the value of diversity, the response to the Monet objection should have
been easy. On that account, the point of establishing diversity in a student
body is not just internal to the academic enterprise, but is linked to broader
goals of social integration and democratic equality."' These broader goals
call for the recognition of a compelling interest in the achievement of
racial diversity within the academy.' 1 2 And, plainly, giving preference to
the applications of underrepresented minorities serves that interest in a way
that crediting the race-independent diversity contributions of non-minority
applicants could not. The Monet objection - which asserts that automatic
race-based preferences constitute unequal treatment because they do not
treat like cases alike - fails for the simplest of reasons: Monet and the
minority are not "like" cases in respect of the contributions to diversity
they each represent.
Yet, as we saw, Justice O'Connor did not even hint at this kind of
deflective response.
Instead, she embraced the Monet objection,
effectively incorporating it into the doctrine of individualized
consideration. By doing so, she directly undermined her discussion in
Grutter of the value of racial diversity. Still, despite her unhesitant
acceptance of the Monet objection, it may strike some readers as doubtful
that Justice O'Connor really could have meant to endorse the various
logical implications of the objection that I have been describing. For
110. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 279 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
111. Cf Guinier, supra note 35, at 206
(If institutions examine closely the relationship between their own educational objectives
and their public mission, a larger set of democratic principles may begin to animate the
process for making allocative choices,.. . [principles] which emphasize[] the importance of
linking an institution's admissions policy for all applicants to its educational and public
missions, combining a commitment to construe educational opportunity broadly with an
obligation to educate individuals who then serve their communities and the larger society.).
112. This is, at bottom, an empirical claim. If it turned out that the achievement of
racial diversity within the academy was not achieving the broader goals of democratic
equality emphasized by Justice O'Connor, then we would presumably have cause to revisit
the rationale for supposing that there is a compelling interest in that kind of diversity.
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example, I have claimed that, by her emphasis on the requirement of
individualized consideration as a constraint on the pursuit of (racial)
diversity, she opened up an interpretation of Grutterand Gratz under which
race becomes just an information-bearing proxy for other characteristics
(e.g., the capacity to enhance educational discourse) to which it happens to
be correlated. That view is independently worrisome for perhaps obvious
reasons,11 3 but it also comes very close to a perspective on the significance
of race that Justice O'Connor herself vigorously contested in her dissent in
Metro Broadcastingv. FCC.14 Thus, it seems unlikely that she knowingly
would have affirmed an interpretation of the individualized consideration
requirement on the terms I have been suggesting, and I do not mean to
suggest otherwise.
But, while speculation about what Justice O'Connor might
subjectively have intended or what she might now be willing to endorse
may be interesting as a matter of diagnosis, biography, or even prognosis, it
is not important to my argument. Indeed, I do not deny that, as Professor
Post has suggested, the best (etiological) explanation of Justice O'Connor's
insistence on the requirement of individualized consideration may be a
purely pragmatic one.' 5 That conclusion is not inconsistent with the
primary thesis I have been trying to advance.
What I have tried to show is that the doctrinal requirement of
individualized consideration cannot be squared with the assumption that
racial diversity is a compelling interest. I have also suggested that insofar
as the requirement of individualized consideration was necessary to the
outcome of Gratz, whereas Justice O'Connor's account of the distinct value
of racialdiversity was not strictly necessary to the outcome of Grutter,the
cases may be construed to have jointly rejected the proposition that racial
diversity is a compelling state interest. But what seems most clear is that
there is no conceptually neat principle, rooted in genuine concerns of equal
treatment, that can reconcile the conflicting elements of the unstable view
with which Justice O'Connor's Grutter opinion and the Gratz decision
have left us - a view on which racial diversity, even if a compelling
interest, is a forbidden aim.

113. See SCHUCK, supra note 18, at 165 (arguing that if race is seen as a proxy for
expected diversity contribution, then "[o]n a parity of reasoning, legitimating the use of this
proxy might equally justify racial profiling by police if it were intended to fight crime and
were sufficiently accurate").
114. 497 U.S. 547, 621 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the use of "race
as a proxy" for underrepresented viewpoints is "the hallmark of an unconstitutional
policy"). But cf Amar & Katyal, supra note 24, at 1761-63 (arguing that Justice
O'Connor's remarks in Metro Broadcasting should be understood as specific to the
particular context of that case and not necessarily applicable to her understanding of the
meaning of educational diversity under Bakke).
115. See Post, supra note 4, at 73-74.

